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Executive Summary
Background
In July-August 2006, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
conducted a mission to Kosovo at the request of the Office of the Kosovo Protection Corps
Coordinator (OKPCC). The purpose of the mission was to assess concerns raised by the
HALO Trust that the extent of the remaining landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO)
contamination in Kosovo had been underestimated and, thus, provided an inadequate basis for
future planning.
The assessment team2 reviewed a sample of task dossiers, including all those identified as a
concern by the HALO Trust. They found some problems with information management in the
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Management section of OKPCC, but concluded that
these problems were modest and had not led to a substantial underestimate of the remaining
contamination problem. Accordingly, the assessment team concluded that the OKPCC and the
EOD teams of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) had the capacity to address the remaining
contamination.3
The report provided 35 recommendations covering additional research and clean-up of files;
improvements in information management procedures; re-surveys of sites for which
documentation was incomplete; and strengthening of the mechanisms through which
members of the public can report mines, UXO, and areas suspected of contamination.
The last of the recommendations was that OKPCC should budget for a monitoring mission by
the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) or an external agency to assess progress in the
implementation of the recommendations by the OKPCC EOD Management section. In early
2007, the head of the OKPCC requested that GICHD conduct this follow-up mission. In
addition to an assessment on the progress in implementing the recommendations from the
earlier mission, GICHD was asked to review Failing the Kosovars – a report issued by the
HALO Trust in December 2006 detailing their findings to that point from a rapid survey of
mine and UXO affected regions of Kosovo – and to recommend steps the OKPCC might
consider to address the issues raised in that report.
The GICHD mounted its second assessment mission from 11-17 February, shortly after the
UN special envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, unveiled the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo
Status Settlement, which recommend what many analysts have termed ‘supervised self-rule.’
This will set in motion a broad transition of authority from organs of the international
community (particularly the UN Mission in Kosovo – UNMIK – of which OKPCC is a part)
to self-government authorities in Kosovo. This transition process has significant implications
for the mine action programme in Kosovo.

2
While not part of the formal assessment team, representatives from HALO Trust participated in all aspects of
the mission.
3
As will become apparent later in this document, the HALO Trust still believes that contamination is much more
extensive than currently reflected in the OKPCC records. These conclusions were based on an assessment of
errors or omissions in those records, and do not reflect evidence presented by HALO Trust some months later.
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Progress in implementing recommendations
The OKPCC EOD management team has made significant progress in implementing the
recommendations of the previous report. Of the 35 recommendations made, complete or
significant progress has been achieved for 32. More specifically:
•
•
•
•

ten have been fully implemented,
seventeen have been implemented, but the activities should be seen as an ongoing
process (this aspect is understood by OKPCC EOD),
four are now being worked on, and
one has been implemented in part.

This leaves only three recommendations4 on which minimal progress has yet to be achieved.
However, the most important items are those directly affecting the population, and these
recommendations were addressed without delay (some have been completed, while others
require an on-going approach). The recommendations which have not been fully addressed to
this point relate to documentation and office procedures. The information management
function requires further attention and this report contains additional recommendations in this
regard.
As part of these recommendations, the OKPCC EOD Management section was asked to
complete a systematic review of all task dossiers that had not been in the sample examined
during the 2006 GICHD assessment mission. There are some task dossiers or individual
documents that have not been located, for which on-going follow-up is required. If problems
are identified that could affect the situation on the ground (e.g. incomplete clearance or
discreditation reports for an area that the owner still considers suspicious), appropriate action
needs to be taken. Where key documentation remains missing, these areas require re-survey to
confirm there is no problem.
The review of task dossiers also identified five areas that will eventually require clearance
(one being a monitoring task5), and three that require technical survey (one being a
monitoring task), as well as 12 areas for further community liaison or survey. The Table
below summarises all changes in task lists resulting from (i) reviews of task dossiers, (ii)
identification of new clearance tasks following technical survey, (iii) transfers of
responsibility from another agency (KFOR, UNHCR, Serb Army, etc.) to KPC, etc.
Table 1 – Changes in task lists: May 2006 to current
Current year list
Future year list
Monitoring list
Total
Changes
from one
period to the
next 

May 2006
16
16
5
37
Completed tasks
New tasks (i.e. added
following tech. survey)
Net change

August 2006
12
22
12
46
5
14

11
11

+9

0

Notes: Current year list = ongoing tasks + other tasks in current year work plan
4
5

See Annex C, Recommendations 22, 28, 30.
For the definition of ‘Monitoring Task’, see Recommendation 14 below
ii

February 2007
8
25
13
46

Future year list = tasks that will need clearance in future years
Monitoring list = tasks that cannot yet be undertaken (in KFOR area; technically infeasible,
etc.)

Summarizing, the systematic review of all task dossiers has not revealed significant unknown
problems.

Reassessment of the remaining threat
The above Table does not incorporate the suspected dangerous areas (DAs) identified through
the recent survey by HALO Trust. It is impossible at this early stage to generate firm
estimates on the amount of additional clearance work that may arise from this source. OKPCC
and Mines Awareness Trust (MAT)6 surveyors have made preliminary visits to the majority
of the sites identified in Failing the Kosovars. For some, they felt it unlikely that a real
problem would be found; for others, a technical survey would be required. This may yet prove
optimistic, but the vast majority of DAs in Kosovo do not pose a serious threat to life and
limb, and do not constrain overall or community-level development (i.e. the DAs would
properly be characterised as low priority). In particular, the majority of the DAs identified by
the HALO Trust are suspected minefields, but there has not been a landmine accident
involving humans reported in Kosovo in over two years.7

Reassessment of capacity
Even if the true extent of contamination is more extensive than previously understood, its
impact remains modest. An appropriate strategy might simply be to extend the duration of the
programme rather than to further increase capacity. However, if Kosovo authorities decide
that the capacities of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) EOD teams should be further
augmented, it would be easy to accomplish this. The performance of the OKPCC EOD
Management section in implementing recommendations arising from the 2006 GICHD
mission has been excellent, and it (along with MAT surveyors) has made preliminary visits to
the majority of the suspected DAs identified in the HALO Trust survey. The EOD
Management section seems quite capable of coordinating the demining programme, even if
the number of KPC teams is expanded. Increasing the number of KPC teams is a rather
straightforward capacity development challenge. KPC has a good work record – no accidents,
no missed mine incidents and seemingly good productivity – all of which indicates capable
management and supervision. As well, there are large numbers of experienced deminers in
Kosovo whose training could be refreshed quickly.
An alternative strategy would be to re-accredit HALO Trust’s demining teams to make more
rapid progress in clearing the remaining contamination. At first glance, this seems an
attractive option as HALO Trust is a capable operator with extensive experience in Kosovo,
and because it would mobilise its own funding. However, this neglects the difficult relations
that prevail between HALO Trust and both OKPCC and UNMAS. Unless these relations were
first healed, the potential benefits from maintaining HALO capacity would be counterbalanced, in part at least, by ‘coordination failure’ costs stemming from the inflamed relations
among the organisations. Given the long history of antipathy8 and the existing levels of
6

MAT is working on the second year of a two-year agreement funded by the EC to maintain two survey teams to
assist OKPCC and KPC.
7
The survey conducted by HALO Trust has documented claims of a number of landmine accidents involving
cattle, plus one involving a tractor and one in 2005 involving a child. These claims had not previously been
reported to OKPCC and, therefore, had not been investigated by the EOD Management Unit.
8
See, for example, Time bombs: Landmines in Kosovo, The Economist, 5 September 2002.
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mutual mistrust, the success of this approach would depend on whether the organisations
involved could make credible commitments to maintain an effective working relationship.

Enhancing planning and local ownership
Regardless of the technical merits of alternative approaches to the remaining contamination,
at this stage in the evolution of Kosovo, the appropriate mine action strategy should not be
determined in isolation; rather, the level of demining services should be decided as part of a
broader planning and budgeting process that allocates the human and financial resources
available over the medium-term among the many demands on Kosovo’s financial resources.
Mechanisms for doing this within the Provisional Institutions for Self-Government (PISG)
already exist and are being further strengthened.
Accordingly, this would be an appropriate time for OKPCC to formulate a multi-year
strategic plan outlining how it plans to address the remaining landmine and UXO problem
over the medium term. This plan should eventually be submitted to the authorities of Kosovo
for endorsement and for incorporation into their medium-term planning and budgeting
processes. The multi-year strategy will also provide a basis for more detailed annual work
plans, which also should be submitted to the authorities of Kosovo as part of the standard
budget cycle.

Conclusions
While the full extent of landmine and UXO contamination in Kosovo cannot be determined
with precision at this time, and may be greater than earlier anticipated, landmines and UXO
are not a significant constraint on development and sustainable livelihoods in Kosovo. No
landmine accidents involving humans have been reported to OKPCC in over two years.
Accident statistics indicate that UXO and abandoned munitions pose a modest threat to the
population, but most accidents appear to be the result of handling.9 The elimination of this
threat requires not only clearance of cluster munitions and other UXO, but also the reduction
of stockpiles of munitions held by the Kosovar population.10 Until this is achieved, mine risk
education (MRE) and clearance efforts should be continued.
The OKPCC EOD Management section has made excellent progress in implementing the
recommendations arising from the 2006 mission. Due to their efforts, and this latest
assessment, further opportunities for performance improvements have been identified.
The OKPCC EOD Management section, assisted by the MAT, has also made progress in
preliminary assessments of the suspected DAs reported by the HALO Trust. Their initial
assessment is that the HALO Trust survey will not alter the contamination picture in a
fundamental way, and that existing and planned capacities will be adequate to address
Kosovo’s contamination problem over the medium term. This assessment seems reasonable,

9

In at least some cases, the cause of these accidents have been recorded as ‘tampering’, which implies some
intention on the part of the victim. As many of these accidents involved young children, ‘tampering’ is not an
appropriate term.
10
There have been reports of stockpiles found by KFOR raids, and of caches in inaccessible areas along the
border with Albania and Macedonia. It would be unsurprising that Kosovars from both major communities kept
stockpiles given the political status of the province remains contested, but it is unclear how significant these are.
iv

but cannot be considered definitive. Technical surveys will have to be conducted on most of
the DAs reported by HALO and clearance will certainly be required for some.11
Plans for the expansion of KPC EOD teams are now being implemented. As a result, KPC
EOD capacity will increase by about 60% compared to 2006. In addition, financing is in place
for contracting mine detection dog (MDD) teams if that proves warranted.12
Given the strained relations between HALO Trust and both OKPCC and UNMAS, it is hard
to gauge the net benefits that might accrue through the extension of HALO Trust’s
accreditation for demining. The additional demining capacities might help, but the mutual
mistrust and, hence, lack of a common vision, strategy, and purpose would be a hindrance.
The Kosovo mine action plan lacks a multi-year strategic plan which, among other things,
complicates the analysis of alternative proposals over a medium term planning horizon. In
addition, the annual work plans are inadequate, which (among other things) makes it difficult
to determine from the otherwise valuable annual reports whether the objectives set for the
year were achieved.
Opportunities exist for bolstering local ownership in preparation for an eventual transfer of
responsibility for the mine action programme to self-government authorities in Kosovo. One
important step would be the submission of strategic and annual work plans to Kosovar
authorities for discussion and endorsement.
A final accounting of the international mine action response to the Kosovo crisis cannot be
done at this point in time.13 Such an assessment should be done two or three years from now
as this will certainly yield important lessons for mine action, and for the international
community more generally.

Recommendations
Recommendation 1
The OKPCC should develop a multi-year strategic plan for the Kosovo mine action
programme.14
Recommendation 2
The OKPCC should formulate annual work plans based on the multi-year strategic
plan, and incorporating new information that arises over time.
Recommendation 3

11

There remains a debate on the specific survey procedures that should be used before declaring that a suspected
area represents no apparent risk. This is particularly critical when assessing minefields or cluster bomb strikes
that have already been cleared (perhaps partially) or where mines have been ‘lifted’, leaving, if anything, very
low density contamination without a clear pattern. The assessment team did not review field operations and
cannot comment on whether the technical survey methods now employed are appropriate in all cases.
12
There are many sites in Kosovo for which MDD would not be an asset.
13
One key issue is whether a survey needs to be conducted toward the end of the emergency response campaign
to provide a basis for an exit strategy. This cannot be determined until more is known about the suspected DAs
arising from the HALO Survey.
14
A possible outline for a strategic plan is appended as Annex D.
v

Following the approval of the Strategic Plan and each of the annual work plans by
UNMIK or its successor organisations representing the international community, the
plans should be presented to the cabinet of the Provisional Institutions of SelfGovernment (PISG), or its successor institutions, for endorsement.
Recommendation 4
As part of its strategic and annual planning, the OKPCC should identify capacity gaps
within the mine action programme relating, in particular, to new capability
requirements (e.g. strategic planning) or the transition to self-government authority
(e.g. need for a national authority, mine action legislation, etc.), and then identify
possible sources of capacity development assistance (e.g. UNMAS).
Recommendation 5
The OKPCC EOD Management section should compile statistical data to assist in work
planning. These might include:
•
•

how many new DAs are reported per months/year, with what result,
average sizes of DAs and person days worked on each.

Recommendation 6
The OKPCC EOD Management section should compile and maintain depreciation
schedules for OKPCC and KPC equipment to assist in annual and medium-term
planning.
Recommendation 7
The OKPCC EOD Management section should write Standard Work Procedures (SWP)
covering:
•
•
•

response to requests for assistance;
priority setting for clearance, and
information management procedures. (Note: The GICHD IMSMA officer for
Europe will soon be in Kosovo and may assist in this regard).

Recommendation 8
Tasks with missing documents in the dossier or IMSMA irregularities should be
included on the survey list, and be visited when other surveys are being conducted in
the area, until documentation is complete and the task is closed.
Recommendation 9
Whenever surveys are conducted, the affected person(s) and local authorities should
sign a form to confirm the work that has been done and, when appropriate, their
acceptance that no obvious threat from landmines/UXO remains at that site.
Recommendation 10
Technical survey reports should include sketches of cleared areas, even if nothing
was found and the area was discredited
Recommendation 11
vi

Ensure that individuals can report UXO or suspected dangerous areas without lengthy
or needlessly intrusive interrogations by police or other officials, so citizens are not
deterred from reporting these dangers to public welfare.
Recommendation 12
The OKPCC EOD Management section should visit the Kosovo Police Services (KPS)
detachment in Suva Reka to assess why suspected DA reports from Lubovci village
have not been forwarded to OKPCC, rectify the problem, and assess whether further
outreach to the KPS more generally may be warranted to ensure all DAs are reported
promptly.
Recommendation 13
Multi-year plans for community liaison and surveys should be formulated to ensure
systematic and proactive community liaison and survey work takes place.15
Recommendation 14
The OKPCC EOD Management section should differentiate between “Future Tasks”
and “Monitoring Tasks” as per definitions along the following lines:
•
•

Future task = a task that should be undertaken in a future time period, for
which there is no impediment to clearance
Monitoring task = a task that cannot or should not be undertaken unless
there is a change in situation (e.g. KFOR relinquishes responsibility for an
area; land use change; etc.)16

Recommendation 15
In its progress and annual reports, the OKPCC EOD Management section should
differentiate between implanted mines cleared from a minefield, mines abandoned but
not implanted, mines destroyed from stockpiles, and mines delivered by a civilian.
Recommendation 16
The OKPCC EOD Management section should continue the steps it has already
initiated to assess all information provided by the HALO Trust as a result of its survey
and further integrate it into work plans for 2007 and future years.
Recommendation 17
The OKPCC EOD Management section should (i) write future SWP and Standing
Operating Procedures (SOP) in Albanian, and ask KPC and MAT for survey reports in
Albanian to ensure these can be understood by local personnel,17 and (ii) should
initiate a programme to translate existing documents into Albanian.
Recommendation 18

15

These should be incorporated into the multi-year strategic plan as per recommendation 1.
The purpose of this refined nomenclature is to allow an assessment of progress relative to BOTH (i) the total
number of tasks and (ii) the number of tasks on which the OKPCC has the authority to work.
17
This could start with the SOP for SM systems, and writing could be delegated to EOD qualified KPC staff.
16

vii

The OKPCC should budget for periodic monitoring missions by an outside agency to
assess progress in implementing the recommendations contained in this report. The
next mission should coincide with the preparation of the Annual Work Plan for 2008.

viii

Introduction
Context
In 1999, an internal conflict between the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) led to a UN Security Council resolution authorising an
intervention by NATO forces. An extensive NATO bombing campaign led to a cease fire in
June 1999, following which Security Council resolution 1244 authorised the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to establish an interim civilian
administration to, inter alia:
•
•
•
•

coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies;
assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons;
promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo;
facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status.

Shortly thereafter, the Security Council instructed UNMIK to …establish, as soon as possible,
a Mine Action Centre to deal with the threat posed to the returnees and internally displaced
persons by landmines and unexploded ordnance.18 The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
subsequently established the UNMIK Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC). In addition
to coordinating the many mine action organisations providing demining, explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD), and mine risk education (MRE) services, the MACC developed an exit and
transition strategy in which, in mid-December 2001:
•
•

the Office of the KPC Coordinator (OKPCC) assumed responsibility as the focal
point for all matters pertaining to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in Kosovo;
the demining battalion of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) assumed
responsibility for mine clearance and EOD.

Provision was made for international technical advisors to support both the OKPCC EOD
section and the KPC, but the majority of international demining operators were instructed to
shut-down their activities and leave further clearance work to the KPC. Some of these
organisations, including the HALO Trust, questioned whether it was an appropriate time for
them to exit.19 Over time, some additional dangerous areas (DAs) have, in fact, come to light,
which led OKPCC to issue a contract to the Mine Action Trust (MAT) to provide two teams
to conduct technical surveys of the known and suspected DAs. As well, the HALO Trust
resumed clearance operations in Kosovo in 2004.
UNMAS conducted an assessment of the remaining mines/UXO problem in May 2006, and
concluded that …the KPC explosive ordnance disposal teams will be capable of addressing
the residual landmine and UXO threat in Kosovo and beyond.20

18

UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Resolution 1244
(1999), 12 June 1999.
19
See, for example, Time bombs: Landmines in Kosovo, The Economist, 5 September 2002.
20
Letter of transmittal from Maxwell Gaylard to Major General Chris Steirn, OKPCC, for the Report on the
Landmine and Cluster Bomb Threat in 2006: Situation Analysis and Evaluation of the Kosovo Protection Corps
Capacity to Address the Problem, 14 May 2006.
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Background to the Assessment
In mid-2006, the OKPCC requested the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) carry out an assessment of the mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO)
operations in Kosovo, with a focus on information management functions. This request
stemmed from criticisms levelled by the HALO Trust that – whether through errors of
omission or commission – the OKPCC and UNMAS had understated the extent of the
landmine and UXO contamination remaining in Kosovo and, therefore, had incorrectly
concluded that the KPC EOD teams had adequate capacity to address the problem. The
GICHD mounted that mission in July-August 2006.
HALO Trust representatives participated in all activities undertaken during the 2006
assessment mission and, during the debriefing at the end of that mission, they concurred with
all of the recommendations arising from the assessment, including:
•
•

•

while OKPCC records were not perfect, omissions were minor and related to
remote, low priority tasks which do not require immediate action;
nothing in the review of records suggested a revision was required to the UNMAS
assessment that:
o mines/UXO represented only a modest threat to the population, and do
not seriously impede movement or socio-economic development;
o there did not appear to be a large unknown problem with mines and
UXO, and the existing and planned capacities of KPC appeared
adequate to address the remaining problem;21
the OKPCC and KPC should be more proactive to ensure that they receive all DA
reports on a timely basis. This should be a continuous survey process conducted by
local personnel.22

This last point addressed the proposal to conduct a rapid re-survey of Kosovo, which had just
been advanced by the HALO Trust. Subsequently, the head of the OKPCC wrote the director
of HALO Trust stating that approval to proceed with survey was not granted. Regardless, the
HALO Trust did go ahead with a survey and, in December, released a report entitled Failing
the Kosovars, which detailed its findings to that point. This report was widely distributed.23
In early 2007, the OKPCC requested that the GICHD conduct a follow-up mission. The
Terms of Reference (TORs – see Annex A) from OKPCC specified an assessment of progress
in implementing the recommendations of the 2006 exercise. Additionally, the GICHD was
asked to consider the Failing the Kosovars report and provide recommendations on actions
the OKPCC might consider in light of that report. Two GICHD staff members, Ted Paterson
and Vera Bohle, undertook this mission from 11-17 February 2007.

Other Developments
While controversies among mine action organisations continued and may even have
intensified in the period between the two GICHD missions, critical developments also
occurred on the political front. In early February 2007, the UN special envoy, Martti
21

HALO Trust representatives did state that they believed there was some unrecorded contamination.
The full list of recommendations are contained in the report from GICHD, Assessment into Operational
Mine/UXO Clearance Activities in Kosovo, 14 September 2006, and in Appendix C of this report.
23
During the latest GICHD mission, HALO Trust representatives distributed a follow-up report detailing
additional findings from its survey, which had resumed in January 2007.
22
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Ahtisaari, unveiled the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which
recommend what many analysts have termed ‘supervised self-rule.’ While the full document
will be presented officially to the UN Security Council (expected in the latter half of March
2007), the general provisions of the Settlement are well known. These covers a range of issues
including a constitution enshrining human rights, the protection of religious and cultural
heritage, and decentralization, as well as provisions on justice, economic development, and
security. The recommendations also provide for a continuing international presence.24 The
key provisions for mine action relate to the security sector, including:
•
•

•

The establishment of a new Kosovo Security Council, reporting to the Prime
Minister,
The establishment of a new Kosovo Security Force (KSF), with initial
responsibility for crisis response, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and civil
protection,
The disbanding of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC).25

The final decision on the Status Settlement rests with the UN Security Council. Assuming it
approves, UNMIK’s existing mandates will remain unchanged for 120 days, the day after
which all legislative and executive authority vested in UNMIK will be transferred to the
authorities in Kosovo. The precise status of KPC (until it is disbanded) and of OKPCC
remains somewhat unclear, as does the process for the eventual transfer of security sector
responsibilities to a new Ministry of Defence.26

Methodology
In addition to reviewing background documents, the assessment team conducted a mission to
Kosovo from 11-17 February to conduct interviews with personnel in OKPCC and its EOD
Management section, and with representatives from UNMIK, OSCE, the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), KPC, Mine Action Trust (MAT), and the HALO
Trust.27 They also reviewed:
•
•
•
•
•

Task Dossiers with outstanding actions recommended (following the relevant sections
of the September 2006 report)
The survey work undertaken (following Annex C of the 2006 report)
The list of Future Tasks
Various documents prepared by the head of the OKPCC EOD section concerning
actions taken to implement the recommendations
Failing the Kosovars and the actions taken by OKPCC EOD and MAT as a result of
that report.

As well, the assessment team visited the KPC EOD teams at their training facility and various
sites in the Dulje Pass area.

24

The Status Settlement proposes (i) an International Civilian Representative (who will also serve as the EU
Special Representative) with ultimate supervisory authority over the implementation of the Settlement, (ii) a
European Security and Defence Policy Mission to ‘monitor, mentor, and advise on all areas related to the rule of
law’, and a NATO-led International Military Presence
25
The KSF will be formed and staffed, and the KPC disbanded, within one year of the adoption of the
Settlement.
26
KPC has always been a ‘reserved competency’ of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)
27
A full list of persons interviewed is provided in Annex B.
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Progress in Implementing the Recommendations
During the 2006 assessment visit, a sample of task dossiers held by the EOD Management
Section were reviewed to ensure appropriate action had been undertaken to either clear or
cancel tasks, or to designate them for future clearance by the KPC. The purpose of this
exercise was to (i) assess whether errors and omissions in DA records had led to an underestimate of the remaining mine and UXO threat within Kosovo, and (ii) in light of the
findings, assess whether the existing and planned KPC EOD capacity was adequate. The
assessment concluded that OKPCC/KPC EOD is in a position to handle the remaining
problems, but provided a number of recommendations to address various shortcomings
identified. The degree of implementation of the recommendations is summarized below, with
the details provided in Annex C.
The OKPCC EOD management team has made significant progress in implementing the
recommendations of the previous report. Of the 35 recommendations made:
•
•
•
•

ten28 have been fully implemented,
seventeen29 have been implemented, but the activities should be seen as an ongoing
process (this aspect is understood by OKPCC EOD),
four30 are being worked on, and
one31 has been partly met.

This leaves only three recommendations32 on which minimal progress has yet to be achieved.
However, a numeric summary of progress is inadequate as some recommendations are more
important than others. The most important items are those directly affecting the population,
and these recommendations were addressed without delay (some have been completed, while
others require an on-going approach).
The recommendations which have not been fully addressed to this point relate to
documentation and office procedures. The information management function requires further
attention and this report contains additional recommendations in this regard.
On balance, given that only six months have elapsed since the last mission, the OKPCC EOD
section has made excellent progress.
Concerning the review and analysis of all task dossiers, the OKPCC EOD has done thorough
work to complete the information contained in both the task dossiers and IMSMA, and to
reconcile these records (details in Annex C). The further review of task dossiers has not
identified significant unknown problems. There are, however, still some task dossiers or
individual documents that have not been located. On-going follow-up is still required. If
problems are identified that could affect the situation on the ground (e.g. incomplete clearance
or discreditation reports for an area that the owner still considers suspicious), appropriate
action needs to be taken. Where key documentation remains missing, these areas require resurvey to confirm there is no problem.
28

Recommendations 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 17, 18, 23, 29, 32
Recommendations 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35
30
Recommendations 1, 11, 14, 31
31
Recommendation 21
32
Recommendations 22, 28, 30
29
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Following the recommendation of the previous GICHD report, OKPCC conducted a
systematic review of all Task Dossiers and compared them with the data contained in
IMSMA, in order to identify further areas for future action. As a result, 12 areas have been
identified for further community liaison or survey, plus five areas that require clearance (one
being a monitoring task at this point), and three that require technical survey (one only being a
monitoring task).33 Taking all information together, the updated tabular overview of future
tasks reads as follows:
Table 2 – Summary of Future Tasks

Source of task
information ▼

2006
Completed
mission

2007 mission34

OKPCC/UNMAS list
Future Tasks

2

KPC Tasks
for 2007
2

16

C 09-12
DA 2538

E 09-07
C 22-11

OKPCC/UNMAS list
Ongoing Tasks

11

536

C 18-66
C 19-12

437

139

140

OKPCC/UNMAS list
“Monitoring”
OKPCC/UNMAS list
modification
New DA on list
Additional Future
Tasks identified in
IMSMA
Low priority subsurface
Additional Tasks
identified via OKPCC
IMSMA & Task dossier
research

Totals

538

2

Future KPC
Tasks
1135

Monitoring
Tasks
1
S 20-42

341

142
1

1
6

243

C 18-64

344

1
DA 4308

2, but two DAs
are same =>

145
746

7

647

46

10

33

2
N 11-12
N 11-13

8
25
13
Total at end of 2007 mission = 46

See Annex C for details.
It needs to be considered that the KPC teams have been in training during the GICHD visit. Some of these
tasks will become “ongoing” as soon as the operations start again.
35
W 01-46, C 09-13, C 18-13, C 18-68, N 11-09, N 29-01, DA 4317, W 01-10, W 02-37, W 02-86, W 17-22
36
C 19-34, W 01-36, W 01-48, S 16-08, S 20-12
37
S 20-48, W 01-47, W 02-84, W 17-16
38
C 19-29 (KFOR), C 19-35 (UNHCR), N 11-05 (Serb Army Task), N 28-01 (KFOR), E 25-25 (KPC Training
Area)
39
C 19-35 had been UNHCR area, now UNHCR requested clearance.
40
E 2525. KPC will start construction in their training area, and some prior clearance will be required
41
KFOR: C 19-29, N 28-01; Serb Army: N 11-05
42
S 24-29, was listed as completed but only some DAs had been completed, others require further clearance (this
is the Dulje Pass dossier).
43
DA 2958, following KFOR report; W 02-52, following MAT report
44
DAs 3943, 4325, 3880
45
DAs 2550 and 2756
46
E 25-58, S 20-18, S 20-23, E 25-56, W 02-27, S 20-04, W 02-49
47
C 18-12, C 19-07, C 22-12, E 04-09, W 02-76, DA 4307
34
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The eight tasks listed for KPC clearance in 2007 represent only the starting position and it is
expected that more tasks can be completed in the course of the year. The OKPCC reports that
all future task areas are marked or fenced and have little or no socio-economic impact on the
communities. For this reason, their clearance can be delayed should more urgent tasks be
identified. The tasks listed in the column “Monitoring Tasks” either:
•
•

are not a priority for clearance at this stage, but may become so if the land use
changes, or
fall under another agency’s jurisdiction (e.g. KFOR).

This list does not include survey tasks or the community requests brought forward by the
HALO Trust, as the latter require a verification survey prior to submission of a Dangerous
Area report. Only then will the areas be entered into IMSMA and added to the future task list.
Details on the ongoing survey are described in the following chapter.

6

Updated Assessment of the Risks Posed by Mines/UXO
In mine action, risk is a function of (i) the technical threat posed by a device and (ii) the
likelihood of someone triggering a device.
The technical threat posed by landmines and UXO is, of course, substantial and need not be
covered here. The likelihood of an accident increases with:
•
•
•

ignorance concerning the locations of landmines and UXO
extent of actual contamination (more dangerous areas implies more risk) and its
proximity to inhabited or utilised areas
the socio-economic impact of each suspected48 DA (i.e. does the DA constrain
development or block access to assets that are vital for local livelihoods)

The first issue can be addressed by MRE, minefield fencing and marking, etc. Such measures
have been extensively applied in Kosovo, and need not be discussed here. The following
sections discuss, first, the extent and, second, the impact of the contamination.

Extent of the Contamination
The simple fact that HALO’s proactive survey has led to additional reports of suspect areas
comes as little surprise to anyone familiar with mine action in Kosovo. Some reported
minefields may have been incorrectly declared safe following a clearance operation or a
survey. Some minefields were never recorded and are not discovered until someone sees a
mine or there is an accident to a person or animal. Records of cluster bomb strikes can be
inaccurate and the actual sites may not be confirmed until local residents see CBUs. In
addition, much of the terrain of Kosovo is mountainous, heavily forested, or otherwise
difficult to access. As the road system improves and the economic ‘footprints’ of communities
expand due to population increases, economic growth, or depletion of the most accessible
natural resources (e.g. trees and game), individuals range farther a-field and uncover
previously unknown areas that are contaminated with explosive devices.
In addition, the ‘bottom-up’ mechanisms for reporting dangerous areas from communities to
OKPCC have been imperfect, for a variety of reasons. Local government was disrupted by the
war and it took some time before new mechanisms introduced by the international community
began to function reasonably well. The fact that criminal charges have been laid against
people found in possession of illegal weapons and munitions means that some people are now
afraid to report dangerous items to the authorities. People engaged in illegal hunting or
woodcutting (often the individuals most likely to discover explosive devices in remote areas)
are naturally reticent to report their finds to authorities.49 Thus, some people may know of
areas contaminated by explosives which they have not yet reported through, or have been
stuck at some point within, official channels. Such areas might well be reported to an NGO
conducting a proactive survey.50
48

Suspected DAs that do not actually contain landmines/UXO do not pose a danger to live and limb, but may
still have an adverse socio-economic impact if people are afraid to use vital livelihood assets.
49
Our last report noted these issues and recommended that OKPCC initiate a more concerted outreach
programme to strengthen reporting from communities, and the steps taken by OKPCC are outlined in Annex C.
50
In many mine-affected countries, nationwide surveys have already been conducted to obtain a complete as
possible picture of the suspected contamination. This had not been done in Kosovo. Presumably, this was
because there were extensive records from the warring parties and, by the end of 2001, it was believed that the
bulk of the contamination had been cleared, leaving only ‘residual’ contamination (i.e. small or remote areas)
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However, the scale of the problem reported by the HALO Trust is a surprise. Failing the
Kosovars included 58 DAs (51 of which were suspected minefields), and the update report
has another 24 DAs. By HALO’s estimation (combining the already known tasks on OKPCC
lists plus the suspected DAs HALO has reported), mine clearance is required for 1,890,000 m2
in 72 DAs (an average of over 25,000 m2 per DA), with another 55 DAs requiring BAC. 51, 52
However, these estimates are based on general survey techniques, and it is impossible at this
stage for the Evaluation Team to determine how accurate the estimates will prove to be. A
worldwide problem for the mine action field is the fact that general surveys have generated
estimates of suspected hazards that overstate the problem, often by enormous amounts.
HALO Trust personnel advised the Evaluation Team that it applied stringent internal quality
control measures to avoid overstating the problem. Regardless, the areas that will eventually
require clearance can only be established after further investigations.
Furthermore, the likelihood that landmines or other sub-surface munitions are actually present
needs to be re-assessed before expensive clearance assets are assigned to a task. For example,
there have been numerous sites in Kosovo where landmines or other munitions have been
dumped at some point after the conflict. Because of the insecurity in Kosovo and
neighbouring countries, individuals and militias have stockpiled munitions (including unused
mines and those ‘lifted’ from implanted minefields). Efforts by KFOR to collect these
munitions, including house searches and charges against those found stockpiling munitions,
mean that some people abandon dangerous items in a field rather than report them to
authorities.
As well, proactive surveys – in all sectors, not simply mine action – must cope with the fact
that some individuals have incentives to report problems which do not exist. For example,
people may hope for compensation if they report the loss of livestock due to landmines, or if
they are denied safe access to their property by suspected landmines. Others may have caches
of munitions that they want to dispose in a remote area, and want to arrange for a clearance
agency to dispose of the dangerous items as quickly as possible. Others may wish to spread
rumours that areas are dangerous so they are free to hunt or exploit the timber without
competition. In some cases in Kosovo, rural families want to remain in the urban areas in
which they sought refuge during the war, and have reported that their lands are contaminated
to delay eviction.
In Kosovo and elsewhere, many individuals will also remain fearful of land even after it has
been cleared or deemed safe. Sometimes this is due to ignorance about the clearance or survey
work undertaken, but, for some particularly risk-averse people, no assurances will convince
that could be addressed on a responsive basis (as remains true today in virtually all European countries). If the
results of the HALO survey turn out to be accurate to a significant degree, then clearly the policy for future
operations should be to conduct a nationwide survey before the exit of the bulk of the clearance capacity.
51
Figures in e-mail from Matthew Hovell, 16 February 2007. The square metre estimates incorporate significant
known areas that the KPC and civilian demining organisations cannot work on because they are designated as
KFOR or Serb Army responsibilities, or (for cluster bomb sites) the priority is so low that clearance should only
be done if there is a change of land use. OKPCC does not currently generate square metre for clearance tasks.
52
In its comments on the draft version of this report, HALO Trust reported the following as of 24 May 2007:
Minefield DAs
86
2,097,110

Community Requests
Area requiring clearance (m²)
8

Cluster Munitions DAs
23
2,100,000

them their properties are safe. As well, people hear rumours of dangerous areas or learn
second hand of reports that mines have been found, and assume there is an implanted
minefield, although the mines may have been dumped on the surface recently.
Finally, the very process of surveying may generate unfounded fears; people might conclude
quite reasonably that if the mine action professionals keep visiting and asking questions, there
must be more minefields in the vicinity.53
Even when a technical survey confirms that a problem exists or is likely, further
investigations including consultations with local informants, often enables the area requiring
clearance to be reduced by significant amounts.54
The Evaluation Team met with surveyors from OKPCC and MAT who made follow-up visits
to the majority of sites identified in Failing the Kosovars.55 In some cases they found the local
information to be suspicious.56 In others they concluded that those who reported to HALO are
fearful due to ignorance about the clearance that had taken place, or because they didn’t
believe the clearance was adequate. In such cases, the OKPCC and MAT surveyors felt that a
visit by a community liaison team would be an appropriate first response.
Conversely, the OKPCC and MAT surveyors did conclude that some of the areas reported in
Failing the Kosovars would require some clearance following a technical survey to establish
the precise perimeters of the DA. In the majority of cases however, the surveyors
recommended a Technical Survey to validate or discredit the DA report. Based on their past
experience within Kosovo, the OKPCC and MAT surveyors believed that some of these areas
would be discredited or the problem would be resolved by spot clearance by the Technical
Survey teams.57 However, there is no certainty that future results will conform to past
experience and each DA needs to be judged on the evidence on the ground.
In summary, it is no surprise that the total suspect area is significantly larger than contained in
the current OKPCC task list. The recent surveying by HALO Trust suggests the problem may
prove more extensive than most informed observers had previously thought likely, but at the
time of the mission it was impossible to determine by how much. More accurate assessments
will have to await the technical surveys planned by OKPCC once the demining season starts
for 2007.58

53

This is well documented in other countries where, for example, development agencies have demanded
clearance of sites when there is no reason to believe – other than the presence of demining operators in the
vicinity – that those sites have ever been contaminated.
54
Some tasks will also be increased if devices are discovered toward the boundaries of the area originally set for
clearance.
55
OKPCC sent its QA and Community Liaison (CL) Officers: MAT its Operations officer and CL officers,
accompanied by one KPC officer, sometimes supported by medics or deminers. The teams included both men
and women, which can assist in getting information from a wider range of informants.
56
This is not to say the HALO Trust teams have misreported. OKPCC and MAT survey personnel are extremely
experienced and they may know specific communities and individual informants better than their counterparts in
HALO. In other cases, the OKPCC and MAT surveyors may have met with additional residents from the local
communities who provided conflicting information.
57
Once again, there may be no technical survey procedures that yield conclusive results for some low density
minefields or for minefields where the ‘pattern’ has been broken because mines have been lifted. The
Assessment Team did not conduct a review of technical survey operations.
58
Technical survey follow-up will be conducted by two 10 person MAT teams.
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Impact of the Suspected Contamination
Failing the Kosovars and the subsequent survey work by HALO suggests the remaining
contamination problem – particularly from landmines – might prove to be more extensive
than previously anticipated. But how intensive is the impact of this contamination on safety,
livelihoods, and economic development more generally?
There is strong evidence that landmines pose only a modest threat to lives and limbs. Simply
put, there has not been a single landmine accident involving a person in over two years. This
also suggests that the threat has only a limited impact on livelihoods. Landmine accidents
result from ignorance or from risk-taking behaviour to exploit assets that are important to a
household’s livelihood. The absence of landmine accidents for an extended period suggests
some combination of the following:
•

•

Kosovars in local communities are aware of the location of suspected minefields in their
vicinity and these minefields do not block access to essential assets,
or
59
the reported minefields do not exist.

This is not to suggest that explosive contamination has no impact on Kosovars. According to
the reports compiled by HALO Trust, a number of Kosovars have lost livestock in landmine
accidents, which would represent a serious loss to many rural households. Suspected
minefields also deny access to land and other assets (timber, game, etc.) which, undoubtedly,
some local residents would wish to use. However, the absence of accidents from landmines
for an extended period suggests that the people affected have alternatives. Further, the pattern
of accidents in recent years indicates that UXO (particularly cluster munitions) and
abandoned munitions (particularly grenades) represent a far greater danger to lives and limbs
than do landmines.
More generally, there is significant evidence that mines and UXO are not viewed as one of the
principal threats to the security of Kosovars. The 2006 internal security sector review (ISSR)
found that …high unemployment, a lack of economic development and widespread poverty
have created an atmosphere of insecurity. Economic instability has exacerbated problems
such as ethnic violence, corruption, increased crime rates and contributed to a growth in
mistrust of Kosovo’s key institutions of government, both international and indigenous… the
greatest security challenge lies in promoting economic development. (ISSR, xiii) This
suggests strongly that landmines, UXO, and other threats to human security should be viewed
in a holistic manner rather than in isolation, as stand-alone activities. The scale of the
response to the landmine and UXO threat needs now to be determined in light of the resources
available for enhancing human security more generally. Ideally, this determination should be
made in large part by self-government authorities in Kosovo.
In summary, while the extent of the contamination in Kosovo may prove larger than earlier
anticipated, its impact on people and communities remains modest. It would be improper to
characterise the contamination as either a humanitarian crisis or a serious impediment to
59

This would be consistent with the findings from last summer’s OSCE survey on the threat of landmines and
UXO, which found: Kosovo wide, the impact the UXO threat appears to have upon the population can best be
described as minimal…and…UXO will remain a threat in this region for many years to come but the impact it
has on the population appears to be decreasing year by year towards a negligible amount. However, one cannot
safely conclude on the basis of aggregated data showing the average person is relatively unconcerned about
landmines and UXO that no individuals, households, or communities are heavily impacted.
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either livelihoods or economic development. Given the fairly remote or inaccessible locations
of many of the suspected DAs listed in the HALO reports, classifying them as ‘high priority’
for clearance is likely to cause confusion among many readers, as this term normally signifies
a task which is both important (in term of risk reduction and development benefits) and
urgent.
Textbox 1 – Setting Priorities in Mine Action
Because there are never enough resources to do everything people might wish for in a particular
period of time, priorities must be established. There are many different approaches used to set
priorities in mine action, but most these are based on some combination of the following criteria
(this example for demining tasks):
1. likely benefits from clearance in terms of:
a. risk reduction – removing threats to lives and limbs, and
b. development – promoting economic growth and poverty reduction
2. urgency or timeliness – is the benefit dependent on the demining being completed in the
short-term? For example, it may be that a road reconstruction project cannot be initiated until
a DA is cleared, but there is no funding available to reconstruct the road next year regardless
of whether the DA is cleared. Therefore, the clearance of that DA is not a priority, at least
within the coming year.N1
In the initial years of a mine action programme, priority-setting is often done by ‘rule-of-thumb’
methods in which managers identify task priorities using only these broad criteria without a formal
system of scoring or ranking alternative tasks. As the most obvious priorities are addressed (e.g.
the minefields blocking roads or where accidents occurred have all been cleared), and as the
governments in mine-affected countries develop their capacities to oversee the mine action
programme, rule-of-thumb approaches are less suitable for setting task priorities. Typically, the
broad criteria are refined, with specific indicators are listed for each criterion to assist in assigning
each DA to a broad priority category (e.g. level 1 priority for clearance), such as is illustrated
below. Sometimes, systems are developed to calculate numeric scores for each alternative task.
CRITERION/INDICATORS
Criterion 1 – risk reduction
There has been a recent accident in this DA (Yes/No)
The DA is adjacent to residential areas or roads/paths
The DA is within a regularly used area
Criterion 2 – promote development
The DA is blocking the reconstruction of infrastructure etc.
AND there is no other constraint blocking that reconstruction
project
The DA is blocking a new investment in infrastructure etc.
AND there is no other constraint blocking that development
project AND a relocation of the investment to a safe site would
not be technically or economically feasible
The DA is blocking a private investment that will create jobs
AND there is no other constraint blocking that development
project AND a relocation of the investment to a safe site would
not be technically or economically feasible
Criterion 3 – reduce poverty
The DA is blocking assets which are essential* for a number
of households.
The DA is blocking assets which are essential* for a single
household.
The DA is blocking safe use of significant areas of a
community’s crop land
The DA is blocking safe use of significant areas of a
community’s grazing land or forests

COMMENTS
If yes, level 1 priority
Level 1 or 2 priority
Level 2 priority.
Level 1 priority (if there is
another constraint, put on
‘watch list’**)
Level 1 priority (if there is
another constraint, put on
‘watch list’**)
Level 1 or 2 priority
(depending on number of
jobs – if there is another
constraint, put on ‘watch list’)
Level 1 priority
Level 2 priority
Level 2 priority
Level 3 priority

* Essential means that the households cannot sustain themselves in that location without access to the
blocked asset.
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** Tasks on the ‘watch list’ are not worth clearing in the medium-term unless the constraint being monitored
changes. For example, if a DA is blocking a potential road reconstruction project, but no donor funds have
been obtained for the project, then clearance of the DA is not a priority. Once donor funds are obtained for
starting the reconstruction project within the short-term, the DA would move from the ‘watch list’ to ‘class 1
priority’.
N1
– Some clearance may also be motivated by treaty obligations (to clear all known minefields), and this
may become a more important criterion as the ten-year deadline approaches for first States Parties to the
Ottawa Treaty.
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Updated Assessment of the EOD Capacity
KPC has seven teams cross-trained in mine clearance, BAC, technical survey, and community
liaison. The MAT has two 10 person technical survey teams,60 who can also conduct EOD,
BAC, and small mine clearance operations. The current plans are for the MAT teams to
remain in Kosovo through the current year.
KPC is expanding capacity in a number of ways. Most obviously, it is training a number of
additional personnel for survey and clearance operations.61 As well, the EOD teams are being
restructured somewhat so half-teams can be assigned to work with other EOD teams. This
means that only half a team will be held-back from clearance operations to be on-hand to
respond to EOD call-outs.62 As outlined in the table below, these changes represent an
increase in clearance capacity of roughly 60% relative to 2006.63, 64
Table 3 – Increase in KPC clearance capacity
2006
All KPC personnel, of which
KPC field personnel, of which
Full time on clearance activities
Less: on call-out duty
Plus: MRE (1/2 time on clearance)
Total available on clearance

2007
109
94
59
-8
0
51

133
118
82
-4
3
81

% change
+22%
+26%
+41%

+61%

Other capacity enhancement measures are planned or underway. Later this year, all KPC EOD
personnel will receive EOD level 3 training, allowing them to deal safely with larger
munitions. As well, OKPCC will assess the feasibility of contracting mine detection dog
(MDD) teams from Bosnia (the U.S. Department of State has already agreed in principle to
finance this if the assessment is positive).
It also is clear that OKPCC, supported by MAT in some areas, has significant capacity. As
detailed earlier in this report, OKPCC personnel made excellent progress in implementing the
recommendations arising from the last GICHD mission in August. On top of this, OKPCC
and MAT personnel were able to make preliminary visits to 51 (88%) of 58 of the sites
mentioned in Failing the Kosovars – this in a period of about two months or less, which
reflects the fact that Kosovo is small and most of the DAs are clustered in a few areas.
Representatives from both OKPCC and MAT said they were confident they would be able to
conduct the required follow-up assessments to these and any other suspected DAs identified
by the HALO Trust during 2007. These assessments will generate a clearer picture of the
contamination problem and allow recommendations roughly as follows:
1) No significant change in plans is required, OR
2) Plans have to be adjusted as follows:
60

MAT was contracted to assist OKPCC in technical survey and in capacity development for the KPC.
Twenty-four new personnel are being trained, along with six MRE officers who will in future work on
clearance when not required for MRE.
62
Until now, full teams provided the EOD response call-out capability. In 2006, KPC received 142 call-outs; an
average of just over one call-out every two days.
63
In addition, the ability to assign half-teams to work temporarily with other teams provides greater flexibility.
64
This comparison does not include the loss of HALO Trust demining assets (principally, 89 deminers).
61
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a) EITHER existing and planned KPC capacities will need to maintained for a
longer period to address the contamination, OR
b) KPC capacities will need to be further augmented to address the contamination
within the planned period.
Ideally, this recommendation should be based on a multi-year plan, which does not yet exist.
We return to this issue in the following section following a brief discussion of HALO Trust’s
2006 proposal to use its own sources of finance to maintain its demining teams to complete
clearance more quickly.65
In brief, the HALO Trust proposed to allocate funds it has raised from its own donors to
maintain its demining teams in Kosovo. On the face of it, this would allow the remaining
clearance to be done more quickly, whatever the true extent of the contamination problem
proves to be. Even if the impact of the contamination in Kosovo is modest, as it appears to be,
a more rapid reduction of that impact would be good for Kosovo and, particularly, for people
living or working in the areas still affected by contamination.66
On the other hand, experience worldwide shows clearly that the overall performance of a
mine action programme depends on far more than the collective demining capacities of the
operators. Clear strategic direction is needed to identify priorities. Effective cooperation is
also required if the collective resources are to be allocated in line with the priorities identified.
It is clear to the Assessment Team that relations between the HALO Trust and both OKPCC
and UNMAS have been strained since at least the exit of the UNMIK MACC in December
2001.67 If anything, relations appear to have deteriorated over the past year or more, as
evinced by the sometimes incendiary language in correspondence among the organisations.
As well, the staff of the EOD Management Section in OKPCC reported to the Assessment
Team that their dealings with HALO personnel took significant amounts of time and typically
led to outcomes that satisfied neither party. Clearly, the requisite level of trust for effective
cooperation at either headquarters or operational levels does not exist at this point in time.

65

See Failing the Kosovars, p. 13 and ‘Strategy’ letter from Guy Willoughby to Maxwell Gaylard and General
Chris Steirn, 7 September 06.
66
It could be argued that the funds available to HALO Trust should be allocated to countries more heavily
impacted than Kosovo, but exploration of this question is, of course, beyond our TORs
67
See, for example, Time bombs: Landmines in Kosovo, The Economist, 5 September 2002.
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Enhancing Planning and Local Ownership
The Evaluation Team believes that it would be an appropriate time for OKPCC to develop a
multi-year strategic plan for mine action in Kosovo. This would be an excellent vehicle for
summarising the work done to date and the latest information on the remaining contamination
problem, which would then provide a basis for:
•
•
•

an analysis of the alternative strategies for addressing that problem over the medium
term,
a recommendation on the strategy that should be adopted, and
the concrete measures needed to implement the recommended strategy.

In addition, a multi-year strategic plan would provide an opportunity to assess the
implications of the Kosovo Status Settlement on the mine action programme and, in
particular, on its continued transition to local ownership. Such a plan would also provide a
framework for annual work plans and allow better tracking of progress over the medium
term.68 Finally, a multi-year strategy would allow self government authorities to assess the
financial implications of alternative strategies over the medium-term, which is consistent with
on-going reforms to the overall planning and budgeting systems.69 This is particularly
appropriate as much of the funding for mine action has been coming from the Kosovo
Consolidated Budget.
Table 4 – Financial contributions from the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (EURO)
Wages & salaries
Goods & services
Total

2004
384,565
485,860
870,424

2005
384,565
341,826
726,391

2006
384,565
359,641
744,205

2007
472,563
363,182
835,745

At the present time, a number of joint organs (i.e. PISG-international community) exist to
consider policies and plans before these are submitted for final approval to the SRSG and/or
the PISG. The relevant organ for mine action is now the Kosovo Transitional Security
Working Group. The strategic and annual plans should be endorsed by it or its successor
organ before being submitted to the self government authorities and to the International
Military Presence.

68

In the current situation, a clear strategic plan would also provide a means for mine action stakeholders to make
an informed assessment of alternative proposals such as have been put forward by the HALO Trust.
69
The Ministry of Economy and Finance has already introduced a Medium-Term Budget Framework and a
Medium-Term Economic Framework to strengthen the economic management and budget planning functions.
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Conclusions
While the full extent of landmine and UXO contamination in Kosovo cannot be determined
with precision at this time, and may prove greater than earlier anticipated. Accident statistics
indicate that UXO and abandoned munitions pose a modest threat to the population, and that
most accidents occur due to handling. The elimination of this threat requires not only
clearance of cluster munitions and other UXO, but also the reduction of unofficial stockpiles
of munitions in Kosovo which, in turn, would require an enhanced sense of security
throughout Kosovo and its neighbouring states.
No injuries to humans from landmines have been reported to OKPCC in over two years.
The OKPCC EOD Management section has made excellent progress in implementing the
recommendations contained in the GICHD report from September 2006. Due to its efforts,
and through findings from the latest assessment, further opportunities for performance
improvement have been identified.
The OKPCC EOD Management section, assisted by the MAT, has also made significant
progress in preliminary assessments of the suspected DAs reported by the HALO Trust. Its
initial assessment is that the HALO Trust survey will not alter the contamination picture in a
fundamental way, and that existing and planned capacities will be adequate to address
Kosovo’s contamination problem over the medium term. This assessment cannot be
considered definitive at this point, and further investigations will need to be conducted on
most of the DAs reported by HALO, while clearance will certainly be required for some.
Plans for the expansion of KPC EOD teams are now being implemented. As a result, KPC
EOD capacity will increase by about 60% compared to 2006. In addition, the U.S.
Department of State has agreed to finance a contract for MDD teams from Bosnia, assuming
there are sufficient sites where dogs can be productively used.
Given the strained relations between HALO Trust and both OKPCC and UNMAS, it is hard
to gauge the net benefits that might accrue had HALO Trust continued demining operations in
Kosovo. The additional demining capacities would help, but the lack of a common vision,
strategy, and purpose would be a hindrance unless these can be overcome.
The Kosovo mine action plan lacks a multi-year strategic plan which, among other things,
complicates the analysis of alternative proposals over a medium-term. In addition, the annual
work plans are very brief, which (among other things) makes it difficult to determine from
the otherwise valuable annual reports whether the objectives set for the year were achieved.
Opportunities exist for bolstering local ownership in preparation for an eventual transfer of
responsibility for the mine action programme to self-government authorities in Kosovo. One
important step would be the submission of strategic and annual work plans to these authorities
for endorsement.
All plans are based on critical assumptions, and the continued validity of these assumptions
should be monitored. The multi-year strategic plan should state clearly any critical
assumptions and make provision for monitoring their continued validity. The annual work
plans should include monitoring of critical assumptions used in planning, in addition to
sections on survey, clearance, MRE, community liaison, survivor assistance, accidents, and so
forth.
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Annex A: Terms of Reference
The Terms of Reference were simply to:
•

•

•

70

conduct an assessment on the progress the OKPCC EOD Management section has
made in implementing the 35 recommendations from the earlier mission undertaken in
July-August 2006;70
review Failing the Kosovars – a report issued by the HALO Trust in December 2006
detailing their findings to that point from a rapid survey of mine and UXO affected
regions of Kosovo – and to recommend steps the OKPCC might consider to address
the issues raised in that report;
write a report documenting findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

These 35 recommendations are listed in the next Appendix and are not repeated here.
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Annex C: Detailed Review of the Progress in Implementing
Recommendations
The recommendations of the 2006 report are listed below in italics.

General Recommendations
Rec 1: OKPCC EOD should task KPC to conduct surveys at the locations summarized in
Annex C of this report.
This recommendation has been met. The details are described below.
Annex C identified areas for re-survey following the review of the Task Dossiers, an update is
provided in the right column:
Table 5 – Areas requiring re-survey
1

SN
43

TD/DA
S 24 – 05 / 548

Priority
No

2

45

E 07 – 41 / 284 et al

Yes (Leskovica)

3

117

E 07 – 49 / 187, 188

Yes (Krivenik)

Update
Discreditation, area is
used by locals
Survey process started
2006 and ongoing
Survey process started in
2006 and ongoing

Further, Annex C recommended community liaison and survey of the following places, with
an update described below each location:


Gjocaj (near Junik)

A survey has been conducted. Survey means for this and subsequent cases: research, visits,
meetings, information of authorities about completions and reporting procedures. Result: The
area is a known DA, which has been listed on the Future Task list.


Jasicq (near Junik)

A survey has been conducted. Result: This area is the same as the one mentioned above for
Gjocaj.


Dimce (FYROM border near Deneral Jankovic)

A survey has been conducted. Result: Further survey required.


Nerodime village (Ferizaj Municipality, hilltops Rrafshi I Kodres se Madhe and
Kodra e Shullanit

A survey has been conducted. Result: Discreditation, the area had been cleared. Community
liaison conducted.


Kalaja Fortress (river junction to Maja, Ferizaj Municipality)

This is the same area as the one mentioned above.
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Irznic (near Decane)

A survey has been conducted. Result: Outstanding technical survey task.


Milaj (Prizren Municipality)

A survey has been conducted. Result: This is DA 4308 on the future task list. This is not a
new DA. It is also listed below as the sixth item in Table 7 – Added future tasks from
IMSMA.
It was also recommended that KFOR should be made aware of the fact that the Serb
community in Lipljan has concerns about UXO. As a result, KFOR has been informed, but at
the same time KPC and MAT already conducted surveys and subsequent clearance of
graveyards in the area. No dangerous items have been found, and it needs to be seen as a
particularly positive development that KPC do clearance in Serb areas without conflict and
the Serb community accepts the work done.
For the areas listed below, a reconfirmation of the priority had been asked for. An update for
the tasks is provided in the right column.
Table 6 – Reconfirmations of priority
SN

TD / DA

Type

1

53

E25-58 / 1485

2

57

S20-18 / 2964

3

62

S20-23 / 3994

4

70

E25-56 / 4032

5

100

W02-27 / 2723

6

102

S 20-04 / 3847

7

110

W02–49 (10 DAs)

CBU
Strike
CBU
Strike
CBU
Strike
CBU
Strike
CBU
Strike
CBU
Strike
CBU
Strike

Surface
cleared
Yes

Priority Subsurface
Low

Yes

Low

Yes

Low

Yes

Low

Yes

Low

Yes

Low

Yes

Low

Update
Future task list
Low Priority, Monitoring
Future task list, Monitoring
(KFOR area)
Future task list
Low Priority, Monitoring
Future task list
Low Priority, Monitoring
Future task list
Low Priority, Monitoring
Future task list
Low Priority, Monitoring
Future task list
Low Priority, Monitoring

The following DAs were tasks that were not listed in the OKPCC future task list, but were
categorised as “Future Task” in IMSMA. For this reason it had been recommended to add
them to the “Future Task” list. An update on the situation in these areas is provided in the
right column:
Table 7 – Added future tasks from IMSMA
1

DA
3943

2

2550

3

2756

4

4325

IMSMA Status
Future Task
EOD Response
Future Task
EOD Response
Future Task
EOD Response
Future Task
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Remarks
CBU strike, MAT
survey 2005
CBU strike, very low
priority, no action now
CBU strike, low priority
CBU strike, MAT

Update
Discredited 8/9/06
On future task list
On future task list
(same DA as SN 2)
Completed

5

3880

6

4308

EOD Response
Future Task
Future Task
EOD Response

survey 2003
Mines, HALO survey
2005, priority
Mines, MAT survey
2003

Completed 28/11/06.
On 2007 task list

Rec 2: OKPCC EOD / KPC should be more pro-active in order to ensure that they receive
information on Dangerous Areas. This includes:
Rec 3: Enhanced community liaison, especially collection of information on mine
accidents with animals.
See answer for recommendation below.
Rec 4: Visits to Municipalities to ensure the DA reporting system is understood and
working.
This recommendation has been implemented, but needs to be seen as an ongoing process.
This aspect is understood by OKPCC EOD, and is part of the plan for 2007.
As an immediate reaction to these recommendations, OKPCC EOD sent out letters to the
municipalities reminding them of the reporting system for suspected items and areas. The
OKPCC EOD Liaison Officer also called the responsible authorities personally. Further, a
meeting with the directorates of the civil emergency and response unit of each municipality
was held by OKPCC EOD on 2 February 2007 in Pristina, at which all aspects dealing with
requests from the population were addressed. This included procedures for a more formalised
process of OKPCC response to municipality requests (e.g. copies of discreditation reports will
be send back to the municipalities and not just to the affected person). As part of the survey
process, municipalities were visited as well as communities. More activities are planned for
this year. The communication lines are well established, which has been demonstrated by the
fact that OKPCC EOD received calls from municipalities after HALO Trust approached them
with mine related issues.
Rec 5: Regular meetings with KFOR and OSCE staff to ensure the national DA reporting
system is understood and working.
This recommendations has been met, but needs to be seen as an ongoing process. This aspect
is understood by OKPCC EOD, and is part of the plan for 2007.
OKPCC has a regular meeting with KFOR and OSCE at least once per month. The reporting
procedures have been and will be stressed at each meeting. For new OSCE members, mine
risk education is conducted and in the course of these briefings the reporting procedures are
explained.
Rec 6: Follow-up of the OSCE survey reports.
This recommendations has been met. All areas reported through the OSCE survey reports
have been followed up by OKPCC EOD (see also detailed descriptions under
recommendation 1 above). The follow-up resulted in one additional, small-scale task.
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Rec 7: Trawl for and find out all relevant information available within Demining
Organisations collective staff memory.
This recommendation has been met. MAT are still working closely with OKPCC EOD and all
information is passed on. For the other organisations, see the recommendations below.
Rec 8: Contact the Team Leader from HALO Trust who claims to have knowledge of
minefields, and ensure that information is correctly processed.
This recommendation has been met. OKPCC EOD interviewed HALO members including the
specific Team Leader, Hasan Luma. The information suggested there was one additional
minefield, which was followed up by MAT in 2006. No mines were found. During the
interview process OKPCC EOD felt there was resistance to providing full information.
Rec 9: A renewal of proactive communication with the Albanian Mine Action Centre
(AMAC) and Danish Church Aid (DCA) about the situation on the Albanian border.
This recommendation has been met. Meetings and telephone calls were arranged with Arben
Braha, the director of the AMAC, and with Derek Frost, the programme manager of DCA. No
new dangerous areas were reported, but an agreement was made that AMAC will send all
completion reports from the border area to OKPCC EOD for information. The communication
lines between AMAC and OKPCC EOD are well established.
Rec 10: Continuation of the systematic survey process (ongoing since 1999).
This recommendations has been met, as can be seen in the responses to the other
recommendations, but needs to be seen as an ongoing process. This aspect is understood by
OKPCC EOD, and is part of the plan for 2007
OKPCC EOD Operations should consider the following recommendations:
Rec 11: Completing the ‘follow-up’ actions indicated in Table 2.
This recommendation has been met so far as possible at this stage. In some cases, further
work will be required (see tables in the “Follow-up of the Review and Analyses of Task
Dossiers” section of this annex).
Rec 12: Up date the ‘master registry list’ of Task Dossiers so that the numerical sequence
can be followed and all Task Dossiers be accounted for.
This recommendation was not met, but a system has been established with a list of contents
for the metal boxes holding task dossiers. Future action on this point should be seen as part of
an overall plan for file/data management and quality assurance. This report contains
recommendations regarding this point.
Rec 13: The “Future Tasks” identified through the Task Dossier review and IMSMA
research should be added to the “Future Task” list, as detailed in Annex C.
This recommendation has been met.
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Rec 14: Reconstitute the missing documents and Task Dossiers and assess them with the
help of the developed review methodology.
This recommendation has been met so far as possible. Some documents remain missing, as
detailed in the “Follow-up of the Review and Analyses of Task Dossiers” section of this
annex. If they are not found, the tasks should be added to a survey or community liaison list.
Rec 15: Continue the review process of Task Dossiers with the help of the developed
methodology, looking carefully for any inconsistencies between the task dossiers and
IMSMA records. Create summarizing cover pages for each Task Dossier. Rather than
compiling tables as in this Review Mission, make any IMSMA changes directly and
document them. Also document which Task Dossiers have been reviewed.
OKPCC EOD made impressive efforts to implement this recommendation. As a result, eight
areas have been identified requiring further attention. Further work will be required, and new
recommendations are provided in this report.
Rec 16: Having undertaken the above step, cross-reference the DAs covered by all Task
Dossiers to those in IMSMA and identify an accurate list of DAs that do not have an
associated Task Dossier. Ensure that these too have been appropriately closed and
documented.
This recommendation has been met as far so possible, but further work will be required. This
again refers to an overall solution for file/data management and quality assurance.
Rec 17: Add the centralised survey reports and ‘ops memos’ to the individual Task
Dossiers.
This recommendations has been met.
Rec 18: Link the information contained in “Operation Normal Life” to the Task Dossiers.
This recommendation has been met.
Rec 19: Improve the instructions from operations to the data entry clerk to ensure proper
data transfer and an auditable record of decisions, for example by using written
instructions– even if it is the same person. File the instructions for follow-up.
This recommendation needs follow-up. It relates to the need for an overall plan for file/data
management and quality assurance. See recommendations of this report.
Rec 20: When using IMSMA for task identification, take the IMSMA ‘status’ as reference,
not the IMSMA “confirmed clear” box. Ensure that all Dangerous Areas have a ‘status’
indicated in IMSMA and where not currently indicated that the status if reviewed before
being entered.
This recommendation is understood by OKPCC EOD, but needs follow-up to ensure data
quality.
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Rec 21: Create proper records before human memory moves on. Transfer all knowledge
to the Task Dossiers, into IMSMA and record the process in Standard Work Procedures
(SWP).
This recommendation has been partly met. A file with forms and procedures has been
presented to the assessment team. There are, however, some aspects missing such as data
processing or the ones mentioned in the recommendation below.
Rec 22: Write simple SWPs on such topics as Priority Setting and Reaction on Requests.
There is a need to maintain an auditable record of management decisions.
This recommendation has not yet been met, and should be in future.
Rec 23: Apply the agreed revised nomenclature for the status of tasks.
This recommendation has been met, random samples were checked in IMSMA.
Rec 24: Consider differentiating between clearance requirement and low priority residual
risk (action only when impact changes) for “Future Tasks”.
This recommendation has been met in terms of planning, but it is not yet documented in the
files or in IMSMA. The details how to proceed were agreed during this visit. A differentiation
will be made between “Future Tasks” requiring survey or clearance and “Monitoring Tasks”
which do not require clearance at this stage, but where monitoring is required on changes of
the situation. This differentiation will be reflected in the Future Task list and in IMSMA. The
term “Monitoring Tasks” will also be used for areas in which clearance has been conducted,
but small areas remain for which clearance has not yet been possible for technical reasons.
Rec 25: Re-assess impact of low priority DAs systematically.
This recommendation has been met (see details in the “Follow-up of the Review and Analyses
of Task Dossiers” section of this annex).
Rec 26: Assess regularly if the status of ‘KFOR Responsibility’ tasks have changed.
This recommendation has been met (see details in the “Follow-up of the Review and Analyses
of Task Dossiers” section of this annex).
Rec 27: Re-communicate Kosovo EOD reporting and communication lines regularly.
This recommendations has been met, as described above, but needs to be seen as an ongoing
process. This aspect is understood by OKPCC EOD, and is part of the plan for 2007.
Rec 28: Consider writing a guideline on demolition drills for the use of SM systems.
This recommendation has not been met, but should be in future because the OKPCC EOD
guidelines are also the SOP for KPC. The guideline should be written in Albanian language.
This task could be delegated to senior EOD staff of KPC.
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Rec 29: Consider adopting the procedures developed in Lebanon for random minefields,
if singular mines are found or accidents with human beings / animals are reported,
(copies of procedures provided).
This recommendation has been met.
Rec 30: Document the human resource/equipment needs of KPC for the coming years.
Specifically consider equipment maintenance and remote areas.
This recommendation has not been met and points to the larger shortcoming in annual and
multi-year planning. Recommendations in this regard are provided in this report.
Rec 31: Search for the documents that record the operational follow-up of mine accidents
that were not caused through tampering.
The search for the documents is still ongoing.
Rec 32: Create a workplan to implement these recommendations.
OKPCC has presented a rough action plan based on the recommendations. It did not contain
timelines, but as most of the recommendations have been addressed already, this is not a
problem at this stage.
Rec 33: OKPCC should discuss with OKPCC EOD the need for an office manager
function to support the work of the EOD cell. The office manager would ensure proper
internal management procedures, for example conduct quality assurance of filing/
documentation and IMSMA data entry, write SWPs etc. The need for a Community
Liaison Officer as assistant to the Mine Risk Education Officer should also be assessed.
This recommendation has been assessed, but there is a budget constraint. OKPCC EOD said
that they would prefer a QA assistant if the budget allows only one new position. It needs to
be ensured that proper quality management systems are established for data processing, entry
and maintenance.
Rec 34: In an endeavour to transfer responsibility to local capacity and built-up
structures following the UN strategic goals for Kosovo, KPC should conduct as
many of the identified tasks as possible, all of them co-ordinated through OKPCC.
This includes KFOR EOD tasks, which would indicate the need for a senior EOD
course for KPC.
This recommendation has been met. There is close cooperation between OKPCC EOD and
KPC. KPC has established a 24-hour EOD call-out system and, thus, is taking on more of the
KFOR tasks. A senior EOD course is scheduled for March, funded through the Ministry of
Defence of the United Kingdom.
Rec 35: An external monitoring visit by UNMAS or an external organisation should be
conducted once per year to ensure the implementation of the above mentioned
recommendations. OKPCC should consider budgeting for this.
The GICHD has conducted the 2007 monitoring visit resulting in this report.
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Follow-up of the Review and Analyses of Task Dossiers
Completeness of Task Dossier Documentation
The Task Dossiers listed below were missing at the assessment in 2006. The column on the
right provides an update on their location and status.
Table 8 – Task dossiers missing during 2006 mission
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Task Dossier
S 24-14
W 11-05
W 17-18
C 18-66
W 02-54
N 11-05
N 27-07
W 17-05
W 08-12
S 20-30
W 02-28
C 22-10
W 02-37

Update
Not found yet
Not found yet
Monitoring Task
Active Task
No action required
Active Task
Not found yet
No action required
No action required
No action required
No action required
Dulje Pass
Active

Three Task Dossier have not been found yet, and one of those found has shifted into
monitoring status. The Dulje Pass Task Dossier is frequently used at present due to the
ongoing survey following the HALO report. The other eight Task Dossiers proved not be a
problem or are active tasks as they had been before.

Follow-up Document Research
The Task Dossiers listed below have been identified to lack supporting documents. The
column on the right provides an update on the status of the Task Dossiers.
Table 9 – Missing documents
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

SN
31
33
34
51
72
101
105
125
126
127
128
130
131

TD/DA
S 20-32 / 900
S 24-31 / 4237
E 07-39 / 1662
W 01-13 / 3912
E 25-19 / 1333
S 05-25 / 2959
W 02-66 /2640, 2639
W 01-43 / 3277
W 01-43 / 3225
W 01-43 / 3242
W 01-43 / 1818
N 21 – 07 / 517
W 08 – 04 / 74

Update
Documents still missing
Documents still missing
Documents still missing
Documents still missing
Documents still missing
Documents still missing
No more action required
Documents still missing
Documents still missing
Documents still missing
Documents still missing
Documents still missing
No more action required

The table indicates that more work is required. If the documents remain missing, the tasks
should be re-surveyed if feasible.
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Discrepancies between Task Dossiers and IMSMA
The Task Dossiers listed below showed discrepancies between the file and the information
contained in IMSMA. The column on the right provides an update on the status of the tasks.
Table 10 – Discrepancies between task dossiers & IMSMA
1

SN
53

2

57

3

62

4

70

5

100

6

102

7

103

8

104

9

107
108

10

110

TD/DA
Remarks
E25-58 / 1485 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface
clearance has been conducted
S20-18 / 2964 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface
clearance has been conducted
S20-23 / 3994 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface
clearance has been conducted
E25-56 / 4032 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface
clearance has been conducted
W02-27 /
No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface
2723
clearance has been conducted
S20-04 / 3847 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface
clearance has been conducted
S20-05 / 2048 Small areas uncleared due to high metal
contamination not accurately recorded in
IMSMA yet. Link other DAs to Completion
Report.
C18-12 /
IMSMA status discredited, but area had
2515,
been subsurface cleared.
2516
S24-02 /
107 and 108 same DA area. Unite DAs in
2322, 2560
one TD, link DAs in IMSMA. Small
uncleared/unclearable area left?
W2-49
No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface
2337
clearance has been conducted

Update
Same DA as 2348, on future
task list, monitoring
KFOR responsibility, on future
task list, monitoring
Survey September 2005, on
future task list, monitoring
On future task list, monitoring
On future task list, monitoring
On future task list, monitoring
Not on future task list, will get
on monitoring list

Subsurface clearance only
documented 10 cm, on future
task list, monitoring
Complete. If uncleared area is
left, it will get on the monitoring
list
On future task list, monitoring

Analysis of Outstanding Tasks
From previous UNMAS list:
Table 11 – Outstanding tasks
TD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

C 19-12
C 19-34
S 24-29
E 09-07
DA 4342
W 01-36
W 01-46
W 01-48
C 09-12
C 09-13
C 13-18
C 18-13
C 18-66
C 18-68
C 19-29
C 19-35
C 22-11
N 11-05

Status 2006
Ongoing
Ongoing
Completed
Partly completed / Future Task
Completed end August
Ongoing
Future Task
Ongoing
Partly completed Future Task
Future Task
Completed
Future Task
Ongoing
Future Task
KFOR
UNHCR area
Future Task
Serb Army Task
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Update
2007 task
Completed
1 DA completed, 1 2007 task
2007 task
--Completed
On future task list
Completed
Completed
On future task list
--On future task list
2007 task
On future task list
On future monitoring list
On future task list for 2007
On future task list for 2007
On future monitoring list

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

N 11-09
N 28-01
N 29-01
DA 4317
S 16-08
S 20-12
S 20-42
S 20-48
DA 2538
E 25-25
W 01-10
W 01-47
W 02-27
W 02-32
W 02-37
W 02-84
W 02-86
W 17-16
W 17-22

Future Task
KFOR Task
Future Task
Future Task
Ongoing
Ongoing
If required Future Task
Ongoing
Completed / EOD Response
KPC Training Area
Future Task
Ongoing
Completed
Completed
Future Task
Ongoing
Future Task
Ongoing
If required Future Task

On future task list
On future monitoring list
On future task list
On future task list
Completed
Completed
On future monitoring list
On future task list
Completed
On future monitoring list
On future task list
2007 task
Monitoring
--On future task list
On future task list
On future task list
2007 task
On future monitoring list

Following the recommendation of the previous GICHD report, OKPCC conducted a
systematic review of all Task Dossiers and compared them with the data contained in
IMSMA, in order to identify further areas for future action. As a result, twelve areas have
been identified for further community liaison or survey, and the tasks listed below require
further attention as described under “Remarks”:
Table 12 – Results of complete task dossier review
SN

TD / DA

Type

1

33

N 11-12 DA
3975

CBU Strike

2

35

CBU Strike

3

293

4

442

5

451

6

526

7

154

8

610

N11–13DA
4180 DU
W 02-76 DA
2350
C 18-12 DA
2515
C 19-07 DA
3936
C 22-12 DA
3944
E 04-09 DA
2608, 1541
DA 4307

CBU Strike
CBU Strike
CBU Strike
CBU Strike
CBU Strike
MF

Surface Priority SubRemarks
cleared
surface
Yes
Low
The area will require full subsurface clearance in the future.
Monitoring task.
Yes
Low
The area will require Tech. Survey
in the future. Monitoring task.
Yes
Low
The area will require
T. Survey in the future
Yes
Low
The area will require full subsurface clearance in the future.
Yes
Low
The area will require full subsurface clearance in the future.
Yes
Low
The area will require T. Survey in
the future
Yes
Low
2608 subsurface clearance
required
Yes
Low
Requires further clearance
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Annex D: Suggested Outline for Strategic Plan
1. Context71
a. Basic data on Kosovo
b. The conflict & the international response
c. Subsequent political developments and outlook
2. Needs assessment
a. Origin & extent of the contamination
b. History and achievements of the mine action programme
c. Description of the existing mine action programme
d. Extent & nature of the remaining contamination72
3. The strategy for addressing Kosovo’s needs
a. Consultation process used in developing the strategy73
b. Strategic issues to be addressed
c. Analysis of strategic options
d. Outline of the selected strategy
e. Key assumptions and risk management measures
4. Vision, strategic goals, and specific objectives for the mine action programme
a. Vision
b. Goals & Objectives
i. Survey & Clearance
ii. MRE
iii. Survivor assistance
iv. Stockpiles
v. Kosovo and International Obligations
c. Capacity development requirements
i. Staff development
ii. Research
iii. Others???
5. Resource requirements
a. Assets (EOD, survey, MRE, etc.)
b. Financial
i. recurrent budget requirements
ii. schedule of investments required
c. Source of funds (resource mobilisation)
Appendices74

71

Most of this section can be taken from earlier reports.
It is critical to be clear about what the outcome of the HALO Trust survey has been. As it is unlikely that a
final tabulation will be available, assumptions will need to be made AND clearly stated, for two reasons:
• the strategy will be based, in part, on the assumptions on the ‘true’ level of contamination; and
• the plan should incorporate specific steps needed to confirm or discredit those assumptions (to be
outlined under 4.c.ii – Research)
73
Including representatives from the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and from HALO Trust.
74
One should provide an account of the known extent of the contaminations since 2001 so it is clear whether we
are ‘winning the war.’ See the file ‘Task Accounting.xls’ for a possible format.
72
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OKPCC, Kosovo Mine and UXO Situation, 16 January 2007
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May 2006
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